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Abstract
The generalized second law can be used to prove a singularity theo-
rem, by generalizing the notion of a trapped surface to quantum situa-
tions. Like Penrose’s original singularity theorem, it implies that space-
time is null geodesically incomplete inside black holes, and to the past
of spatially infinite Friedmann–Robertson–Walker cosmologies. If space
is finite instead, the generalized second law requires that there only be a
finite amount of entropy producing processes in the past, unless there is a
reversal of the arrow of time. In asymptotically flat spacetime, the gener-
alized second law also rules out traversable wormholes, negative masses,
and other forms of faster-than-light travel between asymptotic regions, as
well as closed timelike curves. Furthermore it is impossible to form baby
universes which eventually become independent of the mother universe,
or to restart inflation. Since the semiclassical approximation is used only
in regions with low curvature, it is argued that the results may hold in
full quantum gravity.
The introduction describes the second law and its time-reverse, in or-
dinary and generalized thermodynamics, using either the fine-grained or
the coarse-grained entropy. (The fine-grained version is used in all results
except those relating to the arrow of time.)
PACS numbers: 04.62.+v, 04.70.Dy.
∗aronwall@umd.edu
1
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 The Second Law of Thermodynamics 5
2.1 The Ordinary Second Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 The Generalized Second Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 Generalized Thermodynamics Theorems 11
3.1 Monotonicity Properties of the Generalized Entropy . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Quantum Trapped Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Applications 22
4.1 Black Holes and Babies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 Big Bangs and Beginnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.3 Warp Drives and Negative Mass Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4 Time Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5 Does it still work for Quantum Gravity? 34
5.1 Entropy Fluctuations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2 Quantum Geometries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6 Conclusion 39
1 Introduction
It is been speculated for some time that quantum effects will remove singular-
ities from any theory of quantum gravity [1]. Singularity resolution has been
attempted in both string theory [2] and loop quantum gravity [3]. Implicit in
many of these works is the idea that quantum gravity will permit spacetimes
to evade the classical singularity theorems of general relativity, and thus permit
continuation past the would-be singularity. The classical singularity theorems
all assume certain positivity conditions on the stress-energy tensor. However,
all such conditions can be violated locally in quantum field theory. One might
therefore suppose that in the highly quantum regions near a Big Bang or black
hole singularity, temporary doses of negative energy might induce a bounce,
avoiding the singularity [4].
The question thus arises whether there is a quantum mechanical general-
ization of any of the singularity theorems, which would make singularities in-
evitable even in quantum situations. Such a singularity theorem would have
to have some assumption used in place of an energy condition which is valid
in quantum situations. In this article the (fine-grained) generalized second law
(GSL) of horizon thermodynamics will be proposed as a substitute. Since the
GSL is widely believed to hold as a consequence of the statistical mechanical
properties of quantum gravitational degrees of freedom [5], it is a good candidate
for a physical law likely to hold even in a full theory of quantum gravity.
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Penrose’s singularity theorem [6] applies to classical general relativity cou-
pled to matter obeying the null energy condition
Tabk
akb ≥ 0, (1)
where ka is any null vector. It says that on any globally hyperbolic spacetime
with a noncompact Cauchy surface Σ, if there is a “trapped surface” T on Σ
such that the outward-going null surface generated by T is contracting, then
the spacetime cannot be null geodesically complete. The proof uses the Ray-
chaudhuri equation to show that the null surface generated by T must have
conjugate points, but this is incompatible with the spacetime continuing any
further. The assumption that Σ is noncompact is required to prevent the ligh-
trays from simply intersecting one another outside of T . The assumption of
global hyperbolicity is required because otherwise an initially noncompact uni-
verse can evolve into a compact universe as time passes (and in fact, there are
non-globally hyperbolic black hole spacetimes which satisfy all other conditions
of the theorem but have a Cauchy horizon instead of singularities [6]).
Penrose’s theorem can be used to show that black holes must have singu-
larities. By reversing the time orientation it can also show that if the universe
is spatially infinite, it must have had a Big Bang singularity somewhere [6]. A
further consequence is that there are no traversable wormholes [7], and that it
is impossible to create an inflationary region in a laboratory without any initial
singularities [8]. Analogous results show that the null energy condition pre-
cludes time machines [9] and superluminal communication [10, 11, 12, 13], and
requires that all asymptotically flat or AdS spacetimes to have positive ADM
mass [14, 12, 13].
However, none of these results apply to quantum mechanical systems be-
cause all such systems violate the null energy condition (1) [15]. There are also
otherwise reasonable classical theories that violate the null energy condition [16].
Since negative mass objects probably imply that the vacuum is unstable, and
time machines (and probably also wormholes) would spell trouble for causality
[9], there ought to be some physical principle in the theory which prevents them
from occurring. This principle, unlike the null energy condition, would have to
be true in quantum mechanical situations—ideally, in some complete theory of
quantum gravity.
As a step in this direction, Graham and Olum [17] pointed out that the
self-consistent semiclassical averaged null energy condition on achronal1 null
geodesics was sufficient to rule out time machines, traversable wormholes, and
negative energies.2 Then [18] showed that to first order in h¯, the GSL implies
the condition of Graham and Olum. This means that in any situation where
quantum effects are weak, the no-go results described in [17] will follow.
In this article it will be shown more generally that the fine-grained GSL can
be used to prove the inevitability of singularities, and the absence of traversable
1A set is achronal if no two points are connected by timelike curves.
2They could not prove any singularity theorems, because these typically require the aver-
aged null energy condition to hold on a semi-infinite null ray with one endpoint, a condition
which can be violated by quantum fields.
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wormholes, warp drives between points at null infinity, time machines, and
negative mass objects, even in quantum mechanical situations. It will also be
shown that no baby universes forming inside of black holes can be viable (in
the sense of eventually becoming causally independent of the mother universe),
and that it is impossible to restart inflation in the interior of an asymptotically
flat (or AdS) spacetime.
Horizon thermodynamics also severely constrains models in an FRW-like
cosmology originates out of some other pre-Big-Bang universe. In this context
there are interesting constraints coming from the coarse-grained GSL, as well
as the time-reverse of the fine-grained GSL.
The various results will be shown first in the context of semiclassical gravity,
in which one assumes that quantum effects are small, and can be controlled with
an h¯ expansion. However, this semiclassical approximation is used only in low
curvature regions far from the singularity/pathology in question. In the high
curvature region, other than the GSL itself, the results only require that basic
concepts such as causality, predictivity, and topological compactness continue
to have meaning in the theory of quantum gravity. Thus it is reasonable to
believe that the results will hold in a complete theory of quantum gravity. If
this conclusion is correct, we must either give up horizon thermodynamics, or
else several of the dreams of science fiction fans.
Since there is no well-understood nonperturbative theory of full quantum
gravity (let alone an experimentally-tested one), it is of course impossible to
speak with total confidence regarding the extension of these results to this
regime, which is likely of importance near singularities. It may be that the
concepts used to define the GSL apply only to semiclassical or perturbative
gravity, not to the microscopic theory. So a conservative interpretation of the
restrictions is simply that such-and-such cannot occur except by means of non-
perturbative quantum gravity effects.3 However, I will argue for a more expan-
sive interpretation.
The plan of this paper is as follows: section 2 discusses the second law of
thermodynamics, both in its ordinary and in its generalized form, with specific
care given to the distinction between fine-grained and coarse-grained entropy,
and a discussion of in which senses the second law does or does not rely on a well-
defined arrow of time. Section 3 proves some theorems about the generalized
entropy which will be used later, the most important of which is Theorem 4
which generalizes the notion of a trapped surface to quantum spacetimes. (The
casual reader may wish to skim this section). Section 4 applies the GSL to obtain
the various results described in the abstract. Their dependency relationships
are shown in Fig. 1.
Up to this point, I will make free use of semiclassical notions of spacetime,
even though such concepts are not valid in the full quantum gravity regime. In
section 5, I will argue that the results likely apply even when quantum gravity
effects are taken into consideration. Finally, the Appendix proves a theorem
3While quantum gravity effects are expected to be important near singularities, other
applications of the Penrose theorem do not require them (cf. section 5.2).
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used in section 2.1 to help prove the ordinary second law of thermodynamics.
2 The Second Law of Thermodynamics
2.1 The Ordinary Second Law
The Ordinary Second Law (OSL) of thermodynamics states that the total en-
tropy of a closed system cannot decrease as time passes. For the purposes of this
article I will use as my definition of the entropy of a state ρ the von Neumann
entropy
S = −tr(ρ ln ρ). (2)
This is the analogue for quantum states of the classical Gibbs entropy which is
defined as
S = −
∑
i
pi ln pi, (3)
where pi is the probability to be in the state i. Eq. (2) reduces to Eq. (3)
whenever the density matrix ρ is diagonalized.
In order to interpret the meaning of the von Neumann entropy, one needs to
know whether ρ is interpreted in a fine-grained sense as the complete information
about a state, or in a coarse-grained sense as the information available to an
observer. In the fine-grained picture, closed quantum systems evolve by unitary
evolution as time passes:
ρ(t) = U(t)ρ(t0)U
†(t). (4)
Since unitary evolution does not affect the probability eigenvalues of ρ, this
implies that
S(ρ(t)) = S(ρ(t0)). (5)
The good news is that we have just proven the OSL because the entropy cannot
be decreased. The bad news is that although the entropy cannot decrease,
it cannot increase either, so that the time-reverse of the second law, which I
will denote as OSL, also holds. This is because the entropy is a measure of
the uncertainty in ρ, but the information content in ρ is just the same as the
uncertainty in the initial conditions.
In order to see entropy increasing, we have to move to the coarse-grained
picture. This picture can be motivated by taking a more realistic view of our
ability to calculate the state at a time t from the initial conditions. If you are
a Laplace’s Calculator with a full understanding of the laws of nature and an
infinite calculational capacity, you might well use Eq. (4) to determine ρ(t). But
the universe contains many complex systems for which I at any rate would be
unable to specify U . Given my ignorance of the exact dynamics of the universe,
I cannot fully know what ρ(t) is, even if I know the initial state ρ(t0). The
best I can do is rely on the things I do know about the dynamics to produce
my best guess as to what I think the state is—call this ρ˜(t). Since I know that
the dynamics are unitary, but I do not know the exact unitary laws of physics,
5
Figure 1: The logical dependencies of the main hypotheses, theorems, and re-
sults in this article. If a proposition has one or more arrows pointing to it, then
the conjunction of all propositions pointing to it is used in the proof of that
proposition. g0 is a particular point in the spacetime where the semiclassical
approximation must be valid; its location depends on the particular result be-
ing considered (cf. section 4). The no-time-machines result uses the assumption
that J+(p) ∩ J−(q) is compact for any points p and q; since this is weaker than
global hyperbolicity it is shown as following from it, although going directly
from global hyperbolicity to no-time-machines is of course trivial.
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I ought to be able to model my ignorance as a probability distribution over
the space of possible unitary processes U . This implies that I must be more
uncertain about the universe at time t than a Laplace’s Calculator would be, so
S(ρ˜(t)) ≥ S(ρ(t)) = S(ρ(t0)), t > t0. (6)
(This equation follows from the fact that entropy is a convex function, which was
first proven for quantum systems by Delbru¨ck and Molie`re [19]. The Appendix
provides another proof following the methods of Uhlmann [20].)
Eq. (6) shows that the entropy at any time must be greater than the entropy
of the initial state. This does not quite prove the OSL, because it is not yet
shown whether
S(ρ˜(t2)) ≥ S(ρ˜(t1)), t2 > t1 > t0. (7)
It might be, for example, that the history of the universe from t0 to t1 consists of
some complex, calculationally intractable process, but the history of the universe
from t1 to t2 consists of an exact reverse of that process. Then the entropy would
increase at first and then decrease again later. In order to get the OSL, we need
to know that this sort of thing does not happen in the real world, i.e. the
complex processes which lead us to approximate the state of the universe with
ρ˜ really are irreversible processes. Another way of putting this is that once
we evolve from ρ(t0) to ρ˜(t1), it must be possible to use ρ˜(t1) as a new initial
condition for purposes of determining ρ˜(t2).
A trade-off has been made here. Although the coarse-grained OSL seems
to predict that the entropy will increase rather than just remain constant, by
virtue of the time-reversal symmetry of the laws of physics,4 this is only possible
if there is a time-asymmetrical assumption hidden in the proof. And there is
such an assumption, embedded in the initial condition ρ(t0). In order to get
a nontrivial entropy increase, ρ(t0) must have less than the maximum possible
entropy. In other words, the universe has to have started out with low entropy.5
This means that the coarse-grained OSL only holds in some states (those which
really did have a low-entropy beginning), unlike the fine-grained OSL and OSL
which hold in every state.
The underlying time-symmetry of the argument can be illustrated by imag-
ining that the universe had an infinite past before the “initial” condition. Then
for times t−∞ < t < t0, the same arguments given above show that entropy
must be decreasing, so that the thermodynamic arrow of time is reversed. From
a thermodynamic point of view one might prefer to describe such a universe as
“beginning” at t0 and then evolving “forwards” in time in both directions from
t0.
In order to have entropy increase for all time even with an infinite past, one
might try to impose the initial condition at at t−∞ instead of t0. However,
4or more generally, CPT symmetry.
5It is also necessary not to make any restriction on the final state of the universe. If there
were a low entropy assumption made for both the initial and the final state, it would not
be correct to calculate ρ˜ from the initial condition alone, since that would ignore additional
relevant information. This assumption is implicit in the argument for the OSL given above.
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one would then expect that the universe would have already arrived at thermal
equilibrium by any finite time t—assuming that there are an infinite number of
potentially entropy producing processes before the time t.
This conclusion might be evaded if the laws of physics permit the total en-
tropy of the universe to increase indefinitely without ever coming to equilibrium.
This might actually be the case in theories of gravity similar to general relativ-
ity [21]. In an expanding universe the total volume of space can grow without
limit. In classical general relativity, black holes have zero temperature, and can
therefore store an arbitrarily large amount of entropy using an arbitrarily small
amount of energy. Even semiclassically, it is possible for a thermal black hole to
absorb an arbitrarily large amount of entropy, if it is critically illuminated for
a long period of time [22].6 Then in an infinitely large cosmos, one might have
an entropy which is both infinite and increasing at all times.
Quantum modifications to general relativity may lead to even more exotic
possibilities for cosmologies in an eternal-steady state entropy increase. One
proposal is that each universe can spawn new universes [23, 24], each of which
might continue to increase in entropy without any violation of the OSL. It
has even been suggested that baby universes may have slightly different laws
of physics leading to Darwinian adaptation of universes [25]. Or the universe
might go through a series of cycles of de Sitter expansion and thus grow its
volume and entropy without limit, as in the ekpyrotic model [26]. Are such
pictures possible? In order to answer that question, we will now explore the
generalization of thermodynamics to gravitational systems.
2.2 The Generalized Second Law
One comparatively simple modification which must be made to the laws of
thermodynamics when taking gravity into account, is that there is no longer
an absolute notion of time; there are many equally good “t” coordinates that
can be used. Since the OSL above was formulated in terms of a “t” coordinate,
it is necessary to modify the OSL by considering evolution from an arbitrary
complete spatial slice Σ to a complete spatial slice Σ′ which is nowhere to the
past of Σ. One can then formulate the OSL as the statement that the von
Neumann entropy of Σ′ must be at least as great as the entropy of Σ.
But there is a more profound modification to thermodynamics which arises
for quantum fields in gravitational settings, which is that the laws seem to still
apply in the case of certain open systems. One example of such a system is
the exterior of a black hole. In this case there are gedankenexperiments [27]
and partial proofs [28, 29] which show that the generalized entropy, defined as
6Here we are talking about the ordinary entropy of the interior of the black hole, not
the generalized entropy of its horizon (which is the subject of the next section). The latter
is bounded at any finite energy; the former might not be, depending on ones views about
entropy bounds and black hole information loss. My claims in this article do not require
taking a stand on this controversy, since they will be based on the generalized entropy rather
than the ordinary entropy.
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follows, is nondecreasing with time:
Sgen = SH + Sout. (8)
Here Sout is the entropy of everything outside the black hole and SH is the
entropy of the horizon itself, each defined on the same spatial slice Σ. SH
depends on the gravitational Lagrangian [30], and for general relativity takes
the form
SH =
A
4h¯G
.7 (9)
Na¨ıvely one might have thought that one could make the entropy outside of a
black hole go down by simply throwing entropy across the event horizon. But
such entropy tends to be accompanied by energy, which in turn increases the
mass of the black hole and correspondingly SH. Similarly, Hawking radiation
reduces the size of the black hole but the decrease in SH is compensated for by
the increase of entropy outside of the black hole [31].
There are some nuances in the definition of Sgen. Sout includes a divergent
contribution coming from the short-distance entanglement entropy of quantum
fields near the horizon. This divergence is quadratic with respect to a UV length
cutoff. Thus Sout, defined as the von Neumann entropy (2) is formally infinite
and requires renormalization. A second issue is that in perturbative quantum
gravity, renormalization should lead to higher order terms in the Lagrangian
which renormalize Newton’s constant G and also add higher order curvature
terms, leading to cutoff-dependent corrections to SH. The good news is that
these two problems seem to cancel each other out—i.e. the divergence in Sout
can be absorbed into the coupling constants that appear in SH. This has been
shown to one loop order for certain scalar and spinor theories [32], but there is
an additional term appearing in the horizon entropy for gauge theories which is
still not well understood [33].
Another important question is whether the GSL applies to any other horizons
besides black hole event horizons. The answer seems to be yes: horizon ther-
modynamics seems to apply to de Sitter and Rindler horizons as well [34, 29].
However, the GSL does not hold on all null surfaces [28]; for example the past
lightcone of a point has decreasing area classically, leading to a O(h¯−1) decrease
in the generalized entropy, but the increase in Sout due to quantum effects is
of order O(h¯0) and therefore cannot balance it out. The GSL also seems to be
violated semiclassically on apparent horizons [35].
Following Jacobson and Parentani [34], I will assume that the GSL applies
to the “future causal horizon” of any future-infinite timelike worldline Wfut (an
“observer”). This causal horizon is defined as Hfut = ∂I
−(Wfut), the boundary
of the past of the observer (Fig. 2).
Given any two complete spatial slices Σ and Σ′ with the latter nowhere to
the past of the former, the GSL then says that:
Sgen(Σ
′ ∩ I−(Wfut)) ≥ Sgen(Σ ∩ I−(Wfut)), (10)
7We will refer to SH as the “horizon entropy” even when it is evaluated on surfaces that
are not horizons.
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Figure 2: Black hole horizons, Rindler horizons, and de Sitter horizons are all special
cases of “causal horizons”. The future causal horizon Hfut is defined as the part of
the spacetime which is causally visible to some future-infinite timelike worldline Wfut,
shown as a thick line. The GSL declares that the entropy is increasing with time on
complete spatial slices outside of Hfut (shown as red lines).
where here the “outside” of the horizon used to define Sgen is taken to be the side
on which the observer is, even for cases like de Sitter space where the observer
is enclosed by the horizon (see Fig. 2 for examples of pairs of slices for which
the generalized entropy increases.)
Note that by continuity Wfut may also be taken to be a lightlike ray whose
affine parameter is infinite to the future, since there exist accelerating timelike
worldlines which asymptotically approach any lightlike ray. In this case Wfut
may lie on its own horizon.
Just like the OSL, the GSL comes in two versions depending on whether
we choose the fine-grained or coarse-grained definition of the state ρ used to
compute the entropy. In the case of the fine-grained GSL, there can still be
a nontrivial entropy increase due to the fact that information can fall across
the horizon between Σ and Σ′. (Another way of saying this is that even in the
fine-grained picture we are still coarse-graining over all the information inside
the horizon, a fully objective form of coarse-graining [36]). Since this is the only
way entropy can change in the fine-grained picture, it follows that the only part
of a spatial slice Σ that matters is where it crosses the horizon.
By analogy to the fine-grained OSL, the fine-grained GSL ought to hold for
every state of the universe, without needing to impose any initial condition.
(This can be explicitly checked for many of the existing proofs of the GSL in
particular regimes [28, 29].) And if the GSL is true in all states, its time-reverse
must also be true in all states [18].8
The GSL states that for any past-infinite worldline Wpast, the past horizon
Hpast = ∂I
+(Wpast) cannot increase as time passes:
Sgen(Σ
′ ∩ I+(Wpast)) ≤ Sgen(Σ ∩ I+(Wpast)). (11)
8Technically the laws of physics are invariant under CPT, not T by itself. This does not
affect the argument because the generalized entropy is invariant under C and P. But if the laws
of quantum gravity were to violate CPT, the GSL and its time-reverse might be independent
of each other.
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Of course, it does depend on the initial conditions whether there are any past-
infinite worldlines to which the GSL might be applied. If there are none then the
GSL is trivially true, although it may still be useful in astrophysical settings
in which the spacetime may be treated as asymptotically flat and there are
approximate Wpast’s.
On the other hand, the coarse-grained GSL would also take into account
any entropy production of the matter outside the event horizon. This has the
advantage of treating ordinary thermodynamic processes on the same footing
as the horizon thermodynamics, but has the disadvantage that the truth of the
GSL must now depend on the existence of a low-entropy initial condition. In
particular the spacetime volume between Σ and Σ′ must have its thermodynamic
arrow of time pointing to the future.
Except for the discussion of the arrow of time in a past-infinite universe
(section 4.2), the results of this article will use only the fine-grained version of
the GSL.
The GSL as I have defined it has been proven for semiclassical rapidly-
chaging perturbations to stationary horizons, for free fields and/or Rindler hori-
zons [29]. Proofs are also available for classical spacetimes, and for semiclassical
quasi-steady processes [28]. Whether the GSL holds in a full theory of quantum
gravity is obviously less certain (cf. section 5). And in the case of higher-
curvature corrections to Einstein gravity, it is not yet known whether even a
classical second law holds [37], except in the special case of f(R) gravity [38].
3 Generalized Thermodynamics Theorems
3.1 Monotonicity Properties of the Generalized Entropy
Suppose we have a region of spacetime R which is well described by semiclassical
gravity. “Semiclassical” is a term with multiple meanings [28], but I will take it
to mean the following:
Semiclassical Expansion: A region R will be said to be semiclassical if its
physics can be accurately described by a finite number of terms in an expansion
controlled by h¯G/λ2, where λ is the length scale of whatever quantum fields are
relevant to the problem. This is a bootstrapping procedure in which we start
with (i) a fixed classical background metric, (ii) quantize matter fields and/or
linearized gravitons on this background, (iii) allow these fields to infinitesimally
perturb the background due to nonlinear gravitational effects, (iv) allow that
perturbation to the background to affect the matter fields again, etc. For sim-
plicity we will hold G and λ fixed, and write the terms of the expansion with
respect to h¯.9
For most purposes involving gravitational thermodynamics, it is sufficient
to stop at step (iii), that step being needed only to calculate changes in the
9This is distinct from the semiclassical approximation involving a large number N of
species, in which Nh¯ is held fixed as one takes the h¯ → 0 limit, which will be discussed
in section 5.2.
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Bekenstein-Hawking entropy (which has an h¯−1 in the denominator).
We assume (without proof) that this procedure can be made well-defined
using perturbative quantization of gravitons, which despite its nonrenormaliz-
ability should be valid as an effective field theory when treated using an ultravi-
olet cutoff much less than the Planck scale [39]. We assume that at finite orders
in h¯, this can be treated as if it were an ordinary quantum field theory with
unitary evolution between Cauchy surfaces. When h¯ is infinitesimal the gauge
symmetries of the graviton correspond to infinitesimal diffeomorphisms. This
indicates that any observable O of order h¯n can be localized on the background
spacetime up to terms which are higher order in h¯.
In this semiclassical context, the generalized entropy will be assumed to take
the following form:
Generalized Entropy: The generalized entropy of any codimension 2 sur-
face will be assumed to take the form
Sgen =
A
4h¯G
+Q+ Sout, (12)
where A is the expectation value of its area and Sout is the von Neumann entropy
of the region spatially exterior to it, G > 0 is the value of Newton’s constant
at the renormalization scale, and the correction Q to the Bekenstein-Hawking
entropy is assumed to be subleading in h¯ (or some other small parameter such
as string length). This is natural if Q comes from radiative corrections, as
described in section 2.2.
We assume that divergences in Sout can be regulated using some ultraviolet
regulator such as the mutual information [40]. This regulator must cut off the
entanglement entropy at distance scales less than some ǫ, much smaller than
the length scale λ of the quantum fields (so as to capture all the convergent
physics) yet larger than LPlanck so as to avoid the quantum gravity regime.
Because fine-grained entropy is conserved, all Cauchy surfaces of the exterior
should have the same value of Sout.
In the semiclassical regime one can show the following useful theorem about
the increase of the fine-grained generalized entropy when comparing two null
surfaces:
Theorem 1: Let N and M each be future null surfaces of codimension
1, each of which divides spacetime into two regions, an “interior” Int and an
“exterior” Ext. Let M be either within or on N everywhere (i.e. M ∩ Ext(N)
is empty). (The location of the null surfaces might in general depend on the
state of the fields.)
Let there be a null geodesic g which lies on both N and M , and a time
slice Σ which intersects g at g0. Assume that in some neighborhood of g0, the
spacetime is semiclassical, and N and M are both smooth.10 Very close to g0,
10A typical null surface will develop cusps where its generators enter or leave the surface,
and at these points the surface will not be smooth. On a smooth spacetime these nonsmooth
parts of the null surface are usually of lower dimension, so this assumption is reasonable if the
point g0 is generic.
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the null surfaces N and M will nearly coincide, but they may be separated by
a small proper distance f .
For any neighborhood in the vicinity of g0, there exists a way to evolve the
time slice Σ forwards in time in that neighborhood to a new slice Σ′, such that
the generalized entropy increases faster on M than on N :
∆Sgen(Σ ∩ Ext(M))−∆Sgen(Σ ∩ Ext(N)) ≥ 0. (13)
where ∆ indicates the change in a quantity when evolving from Σ by Σ′.11
Theorem 1 will be proven using a series of three Lemmas.
Lemma A: At the point g0, the surface M is expanding at least as fast as
N is. See Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Two null surfaces N and M are pictured as they appear at one time, on
the slice Σ. N is nowhere inside of M , and coincides with M at g0. (i) the generating
null vectors ka, projected onto the surface Σ, must be normal to the null surfaces.
Because M can only bend inwards relative to N at g0, it is expanding faster than N
there (Lemma A). (ii) f is the proper distance between the two null surfaces N and
M , viewed as a function of M . Near the point g0, f is very gently sloped, and thus
points on N and M may be identified. Integration of ∇2f shows that it is always
possible to find a point X near g0 at which M is expanding faster than N , unless (iii)
the surfaces coincide exactly in a neighborhood of g0 (Lemma B).
Proof: Since N and M coincide and are smooth at the point g0, and M
cannot cross over from Int(N) to Ext(N), N andM must share the same tangent
11Both Σ and Σ′ are assumed to be approximately constant over the length scale set by
the proper distance f—otherwise one could satisfy Theorem 1 simply by evolving forwards in
time on only one of the two null surfaces N or M !
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plane. The null extrinsic curvature of one of the null surfaces, e.g. N is defined
as:
Bab = h
c
ahbd∇ckd (14)
where hab is the pullback of the metric tensor onto the codimension 2 surface
Σ ∩ N , and ka is a (future-oriented) null vector pointing in the direction of the
null generators on N .
The null extrinsic curvature measures the change in the geometry of the
null surface as it moves in the ka direction. There are two contributions. The
first is a temporal component which arises when the slice Σ itself has extrinsic
curvature, but this may be disregarded because it is the same for both N andM .
The second is a spatial component proportional to the extrinsic curvatureKab of
Σ ∩ N in Σ (with a normalization factor coming from the size of the projection
of ka onto the slice Σ). For any vector va and point x, the extrinsic curvature
component Kabv
avb(x) measures how much the surface N curves away from its
tangent plane, to second order, as one travels away from x in the direction of
va. A positive value means that it curves away from the direction of motion of
the null surface, and a negative value means that it curves towards the direction
of motion.
The fact that M is inside of N now places constraints on the extrinsic cur-
vature of N and M at g0. Since N is outside of M , N must bend outwards by
at least as much as M does. Hence:
B
(M)
ab v
avb ≥ B(N)ab vavb. (15)
The expansion of a null surface is related to the null extrinsic curvature as
follows:
θ ≡ 1
A
dA
dλ
= Babh
ab, (16)
where A is the infinitesimal area near a generator, and λ is an affine parameter
satisfying λ,ak
a = 1. Eq. (15) then requires that in the neighborhood of g0,
θ(M) ≥ θ(N). (17)
Q.E.D.
If the strict inequality θ(M) > θ(N) holds, then by continuity inequality (17)
also holds in a neighborhood of the point g0. In the classical limit Sout can
be neglected, so θ gives the change of entropy. In this special case, Theorem
1 follows. In the saturated case where θ(M) = θ(N), Lemma A is not enough.
In order to prove the classical version of Theorem 1, it is necessary to move a
small distance away from the point g0:
Lemma B: In any small neighborhood of g0, either there is a point X at
which θ(M) > θ(N), or else M and N coincide everywhere in that neighborhood.
In the former case, the area increases faster on M than N when Σ is pushed
forwards in time sufficiently close to the point X ; in the latter case, the area
increase is the same for M and N in the whole neighborhood. Either way,
Theorem 1 holds classically.
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Comment 1.1: Lemma A is a special case of Lemma B, and was proven
separately for pedagogical reasons.
Proof: On the spatial slice Σ, let the shortest proper distance between the
surfaces M and N be given by a function f(M). Since the tangent planes of N
and M coincide at g0, f vanishes to zeroth and first order as one moves away
from g0. Since f is only nonzero at second order and higher, in a neighborhood
of lengthscale ǫ, f > ǫ2 ≪ ǫ. Because the distance between M and N is in
this sense small, it is possible to identify points on N and M , permitting the
function to be defined on either of the two null surfaces: f(N) = f(M).
This identification of points on N and M also allows the null generating
vectors ka to be compared on N and M (Fig. 3). When the ka of N or M is
projected onto Σ, it must be normal to that surface, because a lightfront always
travels in the direction perpendicular the front itself. So ka(Σ) = cna, where
na is an outward pointing normal vector and c > 0 is an arbitrary constant
depending on the normalization of the affine parameter λ on N and M . In
order to compare the ka vectors, λ will be chosen so that c = 1 everywhere on
N and M .
For small ∇f this can be used to find the difference between ka on N and
M .
∆ka = ka(M) − ka(N) = ∇af +O((∇f)2), (18)
where up to the higher order terms, ∆ka lies on the D − 2 dimensional surface
M ∩ Σ (or N ∩ Σ). The extrinsic curvature difference can now be calculated
from Eq. (14):
∆Bab = B
(M)
ab −B(N)ab = ∇a∇bf, (19)
where the covariant derivatives are intrinsic to the surface Σ ∩ N . Together
with Eq. (16) this implies
∆θ = θ(M) − θ(N) = ∇2f, (20)
which is a total derivative. Let M (or N) be labelled by an r coordinate repre-
senting the proper distance from g0, and let dσ be the volume element on the
(D − 3) dimensional space of constant r on M ∩ Σ.
Let us define a Green’s function G(y) on the ball of points y with r < R, to
be the solution to these equations:
−∇2G(y) = δD−2(y); G|r=R = 0. (21)
For a sufficiently small R, the metric hab is very close to being a flat Euclidean
metric, so that G ∝ (rD−4 − RD−4)/(D − 4) (or ln(R/r) in D = 4). In any
dimension, G(y) > 0 for r < R, and thus ∂rG|r=R < 0. For sufficiently small
R these inequalities must continue to hold if the metric is slightly deformed by
nonzero curvature. One can now use G to integrate ∆θ on the codimension 2
ball B: ∫
B
G∆θ dD−2y =
∫
B
G∇2fdD−2y = −
∫
∂B
f ∂rGdσ ≥ 0. (22)
15
where we have integrated by parts twice and used the fact that f(0) = 0.
Now either (i) f = 0 in a neighborhood of x, or else (ii) one can find arbitrar-
ily small values of R such that the right hand side of Eq. (22) is strictly positive,
in which case ∆θ must also be positive for at least some points arbitrarily close
to x. Q.E.D.
The subject of the third lemma is the outside entropy term Sout, about which
nothing has yet been shown.
Lemma C: If the two surfaces N and M coincide in a neighborhood of g0,
and Σ is evolved forwards in time to Σ′ in this neighborhood, the entropy Sout
is increasing faster on M than on N .
Proof: There is an information theoretical quantity called the mutual infor-
mation I(B, C), defined for any two disjoint systems B and C, which measures
the amount by which the entropy fails to be additive:
I(B, C) = S(B) + S(C)− S(B ∪ C). (23)
The mutual information measures the amount of entanglement between the
systems B and C. For all quantum mechanical systems, this quantity is mono-
tonically increasing as one increases the size of one of the systems by adding a
third system D [40]:
I(B, C ∪ D) ≥ I(B, C). (24)
This makes sense intuitively, since one expects that the amount of entanglement
between two systems can only be increased when one system is enlarged. This
property can be exploited by setting:
B = Int(N) ∩ Ext(M) ∩ Σ, (25)
C = Ext(N) ∩ Σ′, (26)
D = N ∩ ∆Σ, (27)
where ∆Σ is the spacetime volume between Σ and Σ′. See Fig. 4.
Now by Eq. (23),
I(B, C) = S(B) + S(Ext(N) ∩ Σ′)− S(Ext(M) ∩ Σ′). (28)
Similarly,
I(B, C ∪ D) = S(B) + S(Ext(N) ∩ Σ)− S(Ext(M) ∩ Σ), (29)
where the slice C ∪ D has evolved backwards to the surface Σ, using the fact
that unitary time evolution preserves the entropy. Substituting Eq. (28) and
Eq. (29) into the monotonicity Eq. (24), one obtains
∆Sout(M) ≥ ∆Sout(N), (30)
which shows that the outside entropy is increasing as fast for M as for N .
Q.E.D.
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Figure 4: (i) Two null surfacesM and N drawn on a time slice Σ, where N is nowhere
inside of M . They coincide in a neighborhood of g0. This is the same situation as
Fig. 3, illustrated with a different choice of M and N . The dotted line is the spatial
cross-section used to make (ii) a spacetime diagram of the same situation. N and M
move outwards at the speed of light. The time slice Σ is evolved forwards in time
to a new time slice Σ′ near g0. All the information in Ext(M) ∩ Σ is contained in
three regions: B, C and D. Removal of the region D can only decrease the amount of
entanglement between B and C, which can be used to show that the entropy outside
of M increases faster than the entropy outside of N .
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Proof of Theorem 1: In the semiclassical limit, any effect which is higher
order in h¯ will be dominated by any nonzero effect which is lower order in h¯. Let
the leading order contribution to θ(M)−θ(N) be of order h¯p+1, which corresponds
to an order h¯p contribution to ∆S
(M)
H −∆S(N)H , since the Bekenstein-Hawking
entropy (9) has an h¯ in the denominator. Lemma B says that at every order
in h¯, either N and M coincide or else ∆S
(M)
H −∆S(N)H > 0 for an appropriate
choice of Σ evolution. By applying Lemma B to order h¯p+1, one obtains that
the order h¯p contribution to ∆S
(M)
H −∆S(N)H is positive. By applying Lemma
B at order h¯p, one obtains that N and M coincide at order h¯p. Since Q is
subleading, there is no h¯p order contribution coming from ∆Q(M) −∆Q(N).
Let the leading order contribution to ∆S
(M)
out − ∆S(N)out be of order h¯q. If
p ≤ q, then the area term dominates over the entropy term. If p ≥ q, then since
at this order the null surfaces coincide, Lemma C says that the Sout increases
faster for M than N . Either way, Theorem 1 follows.
The only case not covered by the above argument is when both p = q = +∞,
i.e. whenN andM coincide to all orders in h¯. But then their generalized entropy
is identical to all orders, and thus Theorem 1 is true. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1.2: At least semiclassically, one can extend the notion of a
causal horizon to the boundary of the past of the union of any number of future-
infinite timelike or lightlike worldlines. The reason is that any point on such a
horizon must lie on the horizon of one of the worldlines, and then Theorem 1
shows that the GSL for the union is inherited from the GSL for that worldline.
Corollary 1.3: On the other hand, if one measures Sout in a region less
than the whole exterior of a horizon, one does not always expect the entropy to
increase. In particular, in the Hartle-Hawking state, the existence of nonzero
entanglement will make Eq. (24) positive, which implies that any region less
than the whole exterior will have decreasing entropy, as in Ref. [41].
Comment 1.4: The semiclassical assumption is unnecessary so long as M
and N coincide in a neighborhood of g0. That is because Lemma C depends
only on purely information theoretical properties of Sout, so it is only necessary
to know that Ext(N) is a quantum subsystem of Ext(M).
Comment 1.5: With the possible exception of the no-warp-drive result in
section 4.3, the results in section 4 only depend on the classical part of Theorem
1. That is because in those cases, the null surface M to which the theorem is
applied already has a classical h¯−1 decrease in the generalized entropy, and the
only thing which needs to be proven is that N also has decreasing generalized
entropy.
Theorem 2: Let there be a globally hyperbolic region of spacetime R cut
across by a null surface N into two regions P and F , such that information can
go from P to F by falling across N , but not vice versa. Let Σ and Σ′ be two
Cauchy surfaces of R, with the latter nowhere to the past of the former. See
Fig. 5. Then the generalized entropy of P minus the generalized entropy of F
cannot increase as time passes:
∆Sgen(P )−∆Sgen(F ) ≤ 0 (31)
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Figure 5: The region R is divided by a null surface N into a past region P and a
future region F . A time slice Σ of R is evolved forwards in time to Σ′. All information
in R is stored in the three regions B, C, and D. Weak monotonicity implies that the
generalized entropy of F is increasing faster than the generalized entropy of P .
Proof: The proof given in Ref. [18] is summarized here. Since the regions
I−(N) and I+(N) share the same boundary N in the interior of R, the change in
horizon entropy ∆SH is the same for both of them. Furthermore any divergences
in the entanglement entropy near the boundary must be the same on both sides
[18]. So the only quantity which may be different is the convergent part of the
Sout terms. In all quantum mechanical systems the entropy of three disjoint
quantum systems B, C, D, obeys the weak monotonicity condition [42]:
S(B ∪ D) + S(C ∪ D) ≥ S(B) + S(C). (32)
Intuitively, the more a system is entangled with one quantum system, the less it
can be entangled with another. Set B = F ∩ Σ, C = P ∩ Σ′, and D = N ∩ ∆Σ
(where ∆Σ is the region between Σ and Σ′). Unitary time evolution can be
used to evolve the slice B ∪ D forwards in time onto Σ′, and to evolve C ∪ D
backwards in time onto Σ, without changing the entropy, so Eq. (32) evaluates
to
S(F ∩ Σ′) + S(P ∩ Σ) ≥ S(F ∩ Σ) + S(P ∩ Σ′), (33)
which then implies Eq. (31). Q.E.D.
Corollary 2.1: The (fine-grained) GSL and GSL cannot hold on the same
null surface N unless they are both saturated, and weak monotonicity is also
saturated. In a suitably generic state, these inequalities will not be saturated,
so N cannot be both a past and a future horizon.
Comment 2.2: For Theorems 1 and 2, when applying the monotonic-
ity properties (24) or (32), one may worry that the renormalization procedure
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needed to make Sout finite will interfere with the monotonicity property. How-
ever, so long as the infinite quantities subtracted off of the entropy of a region
only depend on extensive, Lorentz invariant features of the region’s boundary,
the divergent terms combine in such a way as to cancel out of the final result.
Cf. Ref. [18] for a more detailed discussion of this point.
Comment 2.3: Because Theorem 2 follows from purely information theo-
retical properties of the entropy, the semiclassical approximation is not required.
The only requirements are that the regions B, C, D be disjoint quantum sys-
tems with defined entropy, and that time evolution from Σ to Σ′ be unitary and
causal.
3.2 Quantum Trapped Surfaces
The GSL, as formulated in section 2.2, applies only to causal horizons. There
always exist some null surfaces N for which the generalized entropy is decreas-
ing (e.g. for N = ∂I−(p), where p is a point, the generalized entropy always
decreases near p). This does not contradict the GSL so long as N is not a
horizon. The GSL is thus logically equivalent to the statement that any such
null surface N with decreasing entropy is not a causal horizon.
That in turn means that there does not exist any worldline Wfut which
is infinite to the future and for which N is the boundary of the past of that
observer. This can be used to show that certain null surfaces must necessarily
terminate:
Theorem 3: Let N be an achronal null surface, such that g be a null
generator of N , and let there be a point g0 on g at which the fine-grained
generalized entropy is decreasing. That is, there exists a spatial slice Σ, such
that for any neighborhood around g0, there is a way of pushing the slice forwards
in time in that neighborhood to a new slice Σ′, so that
∆Sgen(Σ ∩ Ext(N)) ≤ 0. (34)
Thus if N were a horizon, the fine-grained GSL would be violated for time
evolution near g0.
Suppose that the semiclassical approximation holds near g0, while for the
rest of the spacetime we assume only that it can be described by a Lorentzian
manifold. Then the GSL implies that the null generator g cannot be extended
infinitely on N (either because it exits N , or because spacetime is null geodesi-
cally incomplete).
Proof: If g stays on N for an infinite affine distance, then it too must be
achronal. Furthermore it will have a horizon H on which the GSL is satisfied,
since the GSL must also apply to the horizons of infinite null rays as discussed
in section 2.2. H must lie entirely on or to the past of N , because the past of
g must be a subset of the past of N . Since g is lightlike and achronal, g must
be a generator of H as well as N . Then Theorem 1 implies that the generalized
entropy is also decreasing on H , which would violate the GSL. Q.E.D.
If spacetime is globally hyperbolic, then a stronger result can be shown for
certain surfaces.
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Global Hyperbolicity: A spacetime is globally hyperbolic iff both a) there
are no closed causal curves12 and b) for any two points p and q, J+(p) ∩ J−(q)
is compact.
Global hyperbolicity implies that there are Cauchy surfaces which intersect
every timelike worldline exactly once. Furthermore, one can find a smooth
timelike vector field, whose integral curves must intersect any Cauchy surface
exactly once [6].
Quantum Trapped Surface: Let there be a connected Cauchy slice Σ,
containing a compact codimension 2 surface T which divides it into two regions
Ext(T ) and Int(T ), such that Ext(T ) is noncompact. Let a null surface N be
shot out from T going outwards and to the future; N may be defined more
precisely as the future boundary of the domain of dependence of the exterior:
∂+D[Ext(T )]. Such a boundary is necessarily achronal. If the fine-grained
generalized entropy of N is decreasing with time for each point g0 on T (in the
sense described above in Theorem 3), then T is a “quantum trapped surface”.
Comment 4.1: In the classical limit, the generalized entropy becomes the
area, and the definition reduces to the usual classical one: a surface T is classi-
cally trapped if the area of the surface N is decreasing everywhere at T when
moving outwards to the future. By analogy to this, T is quantum trapped if it
is a compact surface for which the generalized entropy is decreasing everywhere
on a compact, outward-moving N , near every point g0 of T .
Comment 4.2: The existence of a quantum trapped surface does not nec-
essarily violate the GSL, because the GSL only applies to future horizons, and
N is not necessarily a horizon. However, if a quantum trapped surface were a
horizon, then it would violate the GSL everywhere on T .
Theorem 4: Suppose there exists a globally hyperbolic spacetime with a
quantum trapped surface T , as described above. Let the semiclassical approx-
imation be valid near T (but not necessarily elsewhere). Then the fine-grained
GSL requires that the spacetime is not null geodesically complete, i.e. there is
a singularity somewhere.
Proof: By Theorem 3, each of the null generator segments on N , i.e. g¯ ≡
g ∩ N , must terminate at some finite value of the affine parameter λ, because
the generalized entropy is decreasing on it. From this point on, the argument is
the same as the classical Penrose singularity theorem [6] which we summarize
here:
Assume for contradiction that the manifold is null geodesically complete.
In that case, each segment g¯ may be extended to the future beyond N , and
therefore g¯ includes its own endpoint, as part of N . We can rescale the affine
parameter so that λ = 0 at T and λ = 1 at the endpoints. This allows us to
write N as the topological product T × [0, 1], except that some of the endpoints
at λ = 1 may be identified with each other. Since T is compact and so is the
closed line segment [0, 1], it follows that N is compact.
12Traditionally, global hyperbolicity requires also that the spacetime satisfy strong causal-
ity, but this apparently stronger form of global hyperbolicity was recently proven from the
definition given here [43].
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However, global hyperbolicity prevents a noncompact spatial slice Σ from
evolving in time to a compact spatial slice N . To see this, choose a smooth time-
like vector field ta whose integral curves intersect Σ once. Since N is achronal,
the integral curves of ta intersect N at most once. ta can then be used to de-
fine a homeomorphism from N to part of Σ. Since N is compact and without
boundary, it must map to a subspace of Σ which is itself compact and without
boundary, but this contradicts the fact that Σ is connected and noncompact.
Hence the spacetime must actually be null geodesically incomplete. Q.E.D.
For more detailed descriptions of the Penrose proof, see Ref. [6].
Comment 4.3: This shows that the Penrose singularity theorem can be
generalized to quantum spacetimes so long as the fine-grained GSL holds. This
idea that the GSL gives rise to an analogue of trapped surfaces is implicit in
the “quantum Bousso bound” proposed by Strominger and Thompson [44].
Comment 5: Since by time-reversal symmetry the fine-grained GSL must
be just as true as the fine-grained GSL, the time-reversals of Theorems 1-4 also
hold.
4 Applications
4.1 Black Holes and Babies
We will now apply the fine-grained GSL to the case of black hole collapse in
order to show that there must be a black hole singularity somewhere (or else a
Cauchy horizon due to failure of global hyperbolicity). This requires a “quan-
tum trapped surface” on which the GSL is being violated. For a black hole
with radius r ≫ LPlanck, the black hole should normally be described by an
approximately classical metric. So it is sufficient to find a surface T which is
classically trapped (i.e. its area is contracting before taking into account any
quantum effects). This decrease of area then implies an O(h¯−1) decrease in the
generalized entropy, which cannot be compensated for by the O(h¯0) increase
in Sout. Consequently the surface T is also quantum trapped, which by Theo-
rem 4 implies that it must be null geodesically incomplete, or else not globally
hyperbolic—the exact same result obtained by the Penrose singularity theorem,
but now applicable to certain quantum-mechanical situations.
However, just because there is a singularity somewhere does not necessarily
mean that there must be a singularity everywhere. Is it possible to avoid the
singularities somehow and end up in a new universe? Let us define more carefully
what we mean by a baby universe: a baby universe is a spacetime region which
is 1) inside the event horizon of a black hole, 2) contained in the future of the
exterior of the black hole, and 3) can last for an indefinitely long proper time
as measured by at least one observer. That is, there must be able to exist a
future-infinite worldline Wfut inside the event horizon. (Note that if the baby
universe ends up in a de Sitter type expanding phase, there may be multiple
choices of Wfut which are separated by causal horizons.)
Proviso (1) ensures that the baby universe is distinct from the mother uni-
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verse. Proviso (2) rules out other universes which are not formed wholly from
our own universe, but have pasts which are causally disconnected with our own
universe. In particular, the baby universe should not have come from an initial
singularity of its own. For example, Schwarzschild-de-Sitter would not be an
example of a baby universe spacetime. Proviso (3) is necessary to distinguish a
baby universe from the usual picture of a black hole interior in which everything
must end on a singularity in finite proper time.13
Assume that the black hole is in an asymptotically flat spacetime. There
are two different time coordinates which can be used to parametrize any given
Wfut. Let there be a large stationary sphere around the black hole with a proper
time coordinate t. The advanced time coordinate v(x) of any point x is defined
as the maximum value of t on that part of the sphere which is to the past of x.
Another possible coordinate is the proper time τ of the timelike worldline Wfut
inside of the baby universe. Baby universes can be classified by means of the
monotonic relationship between the two time coordinates v(τ) as follows (see
Fig. 6):
1. Viable Babies: Doctors call a fetus viable when it is capable of existing
on its own without further life support from the mother’s womb. Adapting
this definition for baby universes, let us define a “viable baby universe” as
a baby which eventually becomes capable of causally existing on its own
without support from the mother. This requires that there exists at least
one Wfut such that as τ → +∞, v → vmax for some finite vmax. This
is equivalent to saying that Wfut is in the future of a compact spacetime
region.
2. Dependent Babies: A baby universe is dependent if it requires contin-
ued causal influences coming from the mother universe in order to remain
in existence. Apart from these causal influences, the baby can only last
for a finite proper time. This means that for all Wfut, τ → +∞, v → +∞.
3. Transcendental Babies: The remaining logical possibility is that for
some Wfut, τ → τmax for some finite τmax, v → +∞. This means that
the baby universe requires an infinite period of gestation to reach a fi-
nite proper time, and then it goes on to become independent! This very
odd behavior violates global hyperbolicity, because if one takes a point
p outside the horizon, and a point q ∈ Wfut with τ > τmax), the region
I+(p) ∩ I+(q) causally in between them is noncompact. ThusWfut crosses
a Cauchy horizon at τmax. There would therefore be a failure of predictive-
ness across the Cauchy surface unless some new nonlocal physics principle
13Technically, this definition excludes baby universes which are eventually end in a Big
Crunch without spawning any new universes themselves. However, the no-go theorem might
possibly be extended to such cases by arguing like this: As long as the baby universe expands
for a long time without recollapse, there exist approximate Wfut’s in the form of worldlines
which exist for a very long time without collapse. Since the GSL holds for infinite Wfut, by
continuity there ought to be some sense in which the GSL is very close to true for very long
but finite worldlines.
23
were to come into play. An example of such a spacetime is the analytically
continued Reissner-Nordstro¨m metric.
Figure 6: Sample Penrose diagrams for baby universes forming from a collapsed
black hole. Each baby universe is shown to the future of a jagged line representing
the classical singularity, and has a future infinite worldline Wfut falling into it. This
classical singularity may be resolved in some places by quantum effects, however the
GSL requires that true singularities also appear somewhere in the spacetime (also
shown by jagged lines). It further places restrictions on the kinds of baby universes that
are possible. (i) A viable baby universe, ruled out by the GSL. Since the baby universe
ends in a de Sitter phase, several different future horizons can be selected depending
on the choice of Wfut. In the example shown, the black hole evaporates completely,
resulting in a disconnected space. However, the GSL also excludes viable babies which
remain connected to the mother universe. (ii) A dependent baby universe, permitted
by the GSL. The black hole cannot evaporate completely. (iii) A transcendental baby
universe, ruled out by global hyperbolicity. At τmax the worldline Wfut crosses a
Cauchy horizon. As it crosses it sees the entire history of the outside universe, infinitely
blue shifted.
A baby universe will start out being connected to the mother universe by an
umbilical cord through the black hole event horizon. However, a black hole left in
a vacuum will eventually radiate away its mass until it reaches the Planck scale.
What happens after that depends on ones assumptions about quantum gravity.
If the black hole evaporates completely, then the connection must be broken at
a finite value of v. Call the resulting baby universe a disconnected baby. (We
will assume that once the baby universe disconnects, it remains separate rather
than reconnecting at a later time.) Such topology changing spacetimes are non-
globally-hyperbolic [45]. This kind of violation of global hyperbolicity might
well be physically reasonable though, since the loss of predictivity only occurs
at a single point in the manifold. (Quantum gravity might restore predictivity,
by specifying the dynamics of such topology-change points.)
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The alternative is a connected baby, which always remains connected to
the mother universe, either because there is a remnant left over from black
hole evaporation, or because the black hole is illuminated by sufficient infalling
matter to prevent total evaporation. It is also possible for a connected baby
to be viable if e.g. it enters a de Sitter expansion phase, so that horizons form
around individual future worldlines.
All viable babies—whether globally hyperbolic or not—are ruled out by the
GSL, because the viability condition ensures that Wfut has a spatially-compact
future horizon ∂I−(Wfut) existing outside the black hole, which separates the
points which can causally influence the baby universe from the points which
cannot. However, when one traces the horizon ∂I−(Wfut) to the asymptotic
region far from the black hole, then its generalized entropy must be decreasing
with time. To show this, we will first consider the spherically symmetric case,
and then generalize to the non-spherically symmetric case. We will assume that
the semiclassical approximation is valid in the asymptotically flat region, far
from the black hole.
In the spherically symmetric case, the future horizon is defined by v =
vmax (the last moment of advanced time from which a signal can reach the
baby universe). Far from the black hole, the horizon is therefore a contracting
sphere. Since the area of such surfaces is decreasing on the classical black hole
background metric, the Bekenstein-Hawking area entropy is shrinking by an
O(h¯−1) term. Any quantum corrections coming from Sout are O(h¯0), which
is of lower order in the semiclassical expansion. Consequently the generalized
entropy of a future horizon is decreasing, contrary to the GSL.
If the spacetime is not spherically symmetric, then ∂I−(Wfut) may partly lie
to the past of v = vmax. However, it is still true that ∂I
−(Wfut) reaches to past
null infinity, and that the asymptotic area of ∂I−(Wfut) ∩ I− is infinite. On
the other hand, the area of a compact slice of ∂I−(Wfut) is finite when the slice
is taken at large (but finite) distance from the black hole. In order to go from
infinite to finite area, there must exist some point g0 far from the black hole
where ∂I−(Wfut) is contracting classically. But then, by the same argument as
in the preceding paragraph, the generalized entropy decreases at g0.
Therefore if the GSL is true, no such Wfut can exist; in other words there
is no viable baby universe. This is a generalization of a theorem in classical
general relativity using the null energy condition [8].
So far we have not assumed that the baby spacetime is globally hyper-
bolic. Global hyperbolicity would rule out the transcendental babies, as well
as disconnected babies. But of the two, transcendental babies seem much more
pathological because of the “infinite blueshift” of the field modes falling across
the horizon at late times. So even if topology changing events are allowed, it
still seems reasonable to disallow transcendental babies. That would exclude the
proposed quantum tunneling process, described in Ref. [46], as well as the baby
universe spacetime of Ref. [24]. (Even if transcendental babies were allowed,
they would probably be very sensitive to the long term fate of the universe,
since they can only arise inside of black holes that have a finite probability of
never evaporating completely.)
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Thus, assuming both the GSL and global hyperbolicity, only dependent ba-
bies are permitted as a possibility. The reason why the GSL does not forbid
dependent babies is that I−(Wfut) includes the entire exterior of the black hole.
Thus there is no horizon separating the points which can influence the baby
from the points that cannot. However, because any babies must be dependent,
the opportunities for universe creation are limited.
First of all, a dependent baby universe must always remain connected by its
umbilical cord to the mother universe lest it die. But any black hole that is
left to itself will evaporate due to Hawking radiation. So unless remnants are
allowed, everything inside of the black hole must be destroyed if the black hole
ever stops being fed.
Secondly, a dependent baby universe cannot have a cosmology similar to our
own universe, which appears to be heading into a de Sitter expanding phase. De
Sitter space has a compact future horizon around any future-infinite worldline
Wfut. Let there be a spatial slice Σ on which Σ ∩ J−(Wfut) is a compact
region.14 For any non-transcendental baby, v must be finite at every point in
Σ ∩ J−(Wfut). Since v is a continuous function, by compactness, this means
that v has an upper bound in the region Σ ∩ J−(Wfut). This means that no
information can reach Wfut after a certain advanced time v; hence the baby
universe is viable. Consequently, no dependent baby universe can end up in a
de Sitter expanding phase.
So the GSL requires that any baby universes (and their progeny forever)
must remain dependent on this one, and have a different cosmology than our
own universe appears to. (Additional constraints on universe formation will be
given by the GSL in the next section.)
Restarting Inflation. Assuming the GSL and global hyperbolicity, the same
argument that rules out baby universes also implies that one cannot restart in-
flation in an asymptotically Minkowski space, since the compact future de Sitter
horizons would violate the GSL in the Minkowski region of spacetime. In other
words, any inflationary region would become a viable baby universe, and would
therefore be ruled out. This corresponds to a classical result using the null en-
ergy condition [8]. It is also in agreement with the AdS/CFT argument of Ref.
[47]. On the other hand, the prohibition on baby universes appears to conflict
with semiclassical instanton calculations [48] of quantum tunnelling probabil-
ities to restart inflation. However, these instanton calculations correspond to
Euclidean manifolds over degenerate metrics. Their validity is controversial [49].
Traversable Wormholes. Similarly, there can be no traversable wormholes
between two distant regions of spacetime, because any worldline which crossed
from past null infinity of one region, to future null infinity of the other, would
have to have a classically contracting future horizon in the first region. Again,
this result is analogous to a classical result using the null energy condition [7].
14J− has been used instead of I− in order to make this region closed.
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De Sitter and Anti-de Sitter The arguments in this section can also be
applied to asymptotically anti-de Sitter spacetime, and more generally to any
spacetime in which large ingoing null surfaces are contracting. (Thus it does
not matter that Anti-de Sitter space violates global hyperbolicity due to its
boundary at spatial infinity). In the case of wormholes between two asymptot-
ically AdS spacetimes, the prohibition of wormhole traversal is in accordance
with AdS/CFT [50]. Since such spacetimes would have two disjoint conformal
boundaries, there is no way that information could be causally transmitted from
one CFT to the other.
In the case of de Sitter space, ingoing null surfaces are contracting only if
they are sufficiently small. Therefore, the GSL only restricts baby universes
and inflationary regions in de Sitter space if their horizons are at a distance
scale shorter than the de Sitter radius. It may be that this places constraints on
eternal inflation scenarios. However, in order to address eternal inflation it is
necessary to carefully consider the role of entropy fluctuations (cf. section 5.1,
footnote 19).
4.2 Big Bangs and Beginnings
Did the universe have a beginning in time? We have already discussed two
incomplete arguments that it did: a) In section 2.1, the coarse-grained OSL was
used to argue that if the thermodynamic arrow of time always points forwards,
there can only be a finite amount of entropy production in our past. However,
the argument failed for gravitational systems such as general relativity because
of the possibility that the entropy might be able to increase without bound,
permitting systems with infinite yet increasing entropy. b) In classical general
relativity, one can instead use the Penrose singularity theorem to argue that if
the universe is spatially infinite, there must have been an initial singularity. But
this theorem uses the null energy condition, which fails for quantum fields.15
In this section we will use generalized thermodynamics to prove quantum
analogues of both (a) and (b). Let us assume that although the early uni-
verse may have been quantum and inhomogeneous, at late times and at large-
distance scales, the universe is described by some expanding classical Friedmann-
Robertson-Walker (FRW) cosmology. The application of the classical Penrose
theorem to the Big Bang cosmology uses the fact that a sufficiently large sphere
T in an expanding FRW cosmology is an anti-trapped surface, i.e. even the
inward moving null surface generated from T is expanding. When these rays
are instead traced backwards in time, they are contracting and outwards mov-
ing. Assuming global hyperbolicity, at least one ray must be null geodesically
incomplete, which implies a singularity.
To generalize this result to the quantum case, note that if the anti-trapped
15There are also singularity theorems which apply to spatially finite universes [6], but these
theorems use the strong energy condition. This condition can be violated even by classical,
minimally-coupled scalar fields (and was violated in the early universe, if inflationary cosmol-
ogy is true). There is little reason to believe that either these theorems or some quantum
analogue apply to the early universe.
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surfaces are in a semiclassical region of spacetime, the fact that T is classically
anti-trapped means that it is also quantum anti-trapped, meaning that the
generalized entropy of this past horizon decreases when one goes to the past.
Using the fine-grained GSL, it follows from Theorem 4 that the spacetime has an
initial singularity, if spacetime is globally hyperbolic and space is noncompact. It
does not matter if the FRW cosmology has small inhomogeneous perturbations
because small perturbations cannot eliminate the anti-trapped surfaces.
Just as in the black hole case, the mere fact that there is an initial singularity,
does not necessarily tell us that there are no past-infinite worldlinesWpast which
avoid the singularity. But some constraints can be placed on this possibility by
assuming that there is such a Wpast and then applying the fine-grained GSL to
it. Suppose that a past horizon ∂I+(Wpast) exists in the present day universe.
Because of the expansion of the universe, such a horizon should now be a large,
nearly classical object. And by the GSL, it must be nonexpanding everywhere.
In an expanding FRW cosmology, this is only possible if each connected compo-
nent of the past horizon is compact and sufficiently small. Therefore the entirety
of the infinite universe would share a common past history, except for possibly
a set of bubbles each with finite spatial volume.16
This is in stark contrast with the standard hot Big Bang FRW cosmology,
in which sufficiently distant spatial regions have never been in casual contact
with one another. But it is not too different from inflationary cosmology, in
which the exponential expansion of the universe causes distant regions to share
a causal past. One way to provide spacetime with the requisite property would
be if there were an infinite period of inflation to the past of the infinite uni-
verse. Such a spacetime would have past-infinite worldlines, but would also be
null geodesically incomplete due to the fact that an infinite inflating universe
occupies only a piece of de Sitter space.
Similarly a spatially finite universe can easily have all points in its FRW
phase eventually be in causal contact, and it does not even need any initial
singularities to do so. An example would be a Λ-FRW cosmology with a bounce.
In order to analyze the thermodynamic properties of such a past-infinite
model, we now invoke the coarse-grained GSL. Assuming in accordance with
current observations that the universe will end up in a de Sitter-like expanding
phase, there will be future-infinite worldlines Wfut beginning on Earth which
will end up being surrounded by a compact future horizon, containing a finite
amount of generalized entropy (approximately A/4h¯G of the horizon). Assum-
ing global hyperbolicity, this future horizon must remain compact as it is taken
to the past, and includes in particular everything in the past of Earth. This
means that either 1) the generalized entropy inside the horizon has increased
from arbitrarily negative values, or 2) there are only a finite amount of entropy
producing processes in our past lightcone, or 3) the thermodynamic arrow of
16By the generic condition used in the Corollary 2.1, these bubbles are bounded by future-
trapped surfaces. By Theorem 3, they must eventually contract to nothing. If the FRW
cosmology has no final singularity, this must happen simply by the lightrays crossing each
other. Therefore, there exists a complete spatial slice Σ in the FRW cosmology with the
property that the entire Σ lies to the future of any past infinite worldline Wpast.
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time is reversed somewhere in our past, so that the coarse-grained GSL does
not hold.
Option (1) is not possible if the generalized entropy has a direct state count-
ing interpretation in terms of discrete Planck-scale degrees of freedom, and in
any case seems somewhat bizarre. Option (2) would involve the universe being
in a near-equilibrium state for the first “half” of eternity and then for some
inexplicable reason exiting this equilibrium. Option (3), although strange seem-
ing, arises naturally if the low entropy “initial conditions” of the universe are
actually imposed on some finite time slice (cf. section 2.1). In this scenario, the
universe can be said to have a beginning in a thermodynamic sense even if it
does not have a beginning in a geometrical sense.
Option (3) works best if the universe is spatially finite. In a spatially finite
universe, the horizon of Wfut can, when traced backwards in time, intersect
itself and disappear entirely at a time t∗. (In the case of a spatially-infinite,
globally hyperbolic universe the horizon can only disappear entirely by hitting
an initial singularity.) Since before t∗ there is no horizon, the fine-grained
generalized entropy is simply a constant, equal to the fine-grained entropy of
the total universe. This explains why the fine-grained entropy does not decrease
indefinitely when one goes backwards in time. But if the horizon goes back in
time forever, one would run into problems with the fine-grained GSL. Since
the fine-grained GSL does not depend on an arrow of time (cf. section 2.2),
one would have to endorse options (1) or (2) with respect to the fine-grained
generalized entropy, eliminating the benefit obtained from reversing the arrow
of time.
Putting all these considerations together, if the GSL is a valid law of nature,
it strongly suggests that either the universe had a finite beginning in time, or
else it is spatially finite and the arrow of time was reversed previous to the
Big Bang.17 In the latter case, it could still be said that the universe had a
beginning in a thermodynamic sense, because both branches of the cosmology
would be to the thermodynamic future of the Big Bang.
4.3 Warp Drives and Negative Mass Objects
The fine-grained GSL can also be used to rule out certain kinds of warp drive
spacetimes. We will consider spacetimes M which are asymptotically flat and
globally hyperbolic, but which have in their interior some gravitational fields
which are capable of bending the lightcones so as to enable superluminal travel.
See Ref. [51] for discussions of such spacetimes.
Since the positions of the lightcones depends on the choice of coordinates,
it is necessary to provide a diffeomorphism-invariant definition of superluminal
travel. Coming up with a sensible definition is tricky, since diffeomorphisms
can move around the start and finish points. In order to deal with this, this
section will only consider the case of asymptotic warp drives, which speed up the
propagation of light rays relative to the asymptotic structure of the spacetime.
17In a bouncing scenario, it is not logically necessary that the moment of lowest entropy
was the same as the moment of smallest size, but it seems natural to make this identification.
29
The approach here is inspired by Ref. [10], which defined a lightray as being
superluminal if it travels between a certain pair of 2-surfaces faster than any
nearby lightray. However, instead of looking at travel between two 2-surfaces
separated by a finite distance, I will consider a lightray g travelling from the
past conformal boundary I− to the future conformal boundary I+.
Intuitively, a spacetime is a warp drive if there exists a compact region
D ∈ M such that light-speed signals which pass through D are advanced by a
finite time relative to signals which ”go around” in M −D. (See Fig. 7.)
Figure 7: This diagram shows light signals travelling through space from an asymp-
totic past origin L− to an asymptotic future destination L+. A warp drive is defined
as a compact region D of spacetime, such that some null curve g passing through D
is advanced by a finite time relative to any curve g′ which does not pass through g.
More precisely, let us define a “warp drive” as a compact spacetime region
D ∈ M , with the property that there exist points L− ∈ I− and L+ ∈ I+ such
that (see Fig. 8):
1. L− and L+ are achronal (i.e. they are not connected by any timelike
curve),
2. There exists a null curve g travelling from L− to L+ passing through the
region D, but
3. In the partial spacetime M −D, any null curves travelling from L− to I+
are delayed by a finite time. In other words, for any other point p ∈ I+,
if p is null separated from L+, and if p is sufficiently close to L+, then it
is not possible to send a signal from L+ to p.
To summarize this definition, L+ and L− are lightlike separated in M , but
spacelike separated on M − D. This indicates that null curves which travel
through D are advanced by a finite time compared to those which go around D.
A few comments on this definition: First, conditions 1 and 2 implicitly re-
quire g to be an achronal null curve, which in turn implies that it is a “fastest
possible” geodesic connecting I− and I+. The existence of a curve with maxi-
mum possible speed follows from global hyperbolicity for any warp drive space-
time, since the space of causal curves between any two compact subsets of a
globally hyperbolic spacetime is itself compact [52].
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Figure 8: i) A spacetime diagram of the warp drive. The null curve g passes through
the region D in order to connect points L− and L+ on the conformal boundary.
There exist points p to the null future of L+ which cannot be accessed from L−
without passing through the region D. The null curve g lies on both the future horizon
Hfut = ∂I
−(L+) and the past horizon Hpast = ∂I
+(L−). However, these horizons need
not coincide except at g. ii) A picture of a spatial slice that cuts through the point
g0. The two horizons define three regions, F to the future of g, P to the past of g, and
the spacelike separated other region O. Assuming the semiclassical approximation is
valid at g0, Theorems 1 and 2 can then be applied to show a violation of either the
GSL or GSL.
The points L− and L+ must be in diametrically opposite spatial directions,
since all other points in I+ are chronal to any L−. This is why condition 3
above restricts attention to points in I+ which are null separated to L+.
One might na¨ıvely that even in flat spacetime, a region D could satisfy this
definition simply by blocking the shortest path between L− and L+, and thus
forcing any lightrays connecting L− and L+ in M − D to go around a longer
way. However, because L− and L+ are infinitely far away, lightrays only need
to bend by a small amount to get around D, leading to a delay that can be
made arbitrarily small, meaning that condition 3 is not satisfied.
Finally, this definition applies only to warp drives that lead to a finite ad-
vance for lightrays travelling over an infinite distance. The result does not apply
to cases where there is a speed up only over a finite distance.
We will now show a contradiction between generalized thermodynamics and
the existence of warp drives as defined above. Since there exist infinite worldlines
beginning on L− or ending on L+, these points define Rindler-like horizons
cutting through the spacetimeM . These two horizons cutM into three regions,
P = I−(L+), F = I−(L+), and the remainder O =M−F −P (P and O cannot
overlap or L− and L+ would be timelike rather than lightlike). g is required to
lie in both the causal past region J−(L+) and the causal future region J+(L−).
However, it cannot lie in the interior of either region, or there would be a timelike
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curve going from L− to L+. Consequently it must be a null geodesic lying on
the boundary of these regions, on both the future horizon Hfut = ∂I
−(L+) and
the past horizon Hpast = ∂I
+(L−). Assuming that F obeys the GSL and P
obeys the GSL, it is now possible to derive a contradiction.
Although the fields may not be semiclassical in the region D, there ought to
exist at least one point g0 ∈ g on which the semiclassical limit does hold in the
asymptotically flat region away from any significant matter excitations. At this
point g0, Theorem 1 may be invoked to show that if the GSL holds on F , it also
holds on F + O. Furthermore, Corollary 2.1 (choosing R = M) implies that if
the GSL holds on F +O and the GSL holds on P , then the state is not generic.
But if there are any warp drive spacetimes, there are also generic ones, since if
a lightray is advanced by a finite time by travelling through D (condition 3), an
infinitesimal generic perturbation of the spacetime must preserve this property.
It follows that either there are no (asymptotically flat, globally hyperbolic) warp
drive spacetimes, or else the GSL or GSL are violated.
This result is a generalization of the classical theorems of Refs. [10, 11, 13].
Positive Energy Theorem. An immediate corollary is that the GSL and
GSL together imply a positive energy theorem, by the principles outlined in
Ref. [14]. Suppose we have an asymptotically flat spacetime containing an
isolated compact object with some ADM mass. Now an object with a positive
ADM mass causes lightrays passing through its asymptotic gravitational field
to be delayed. For a negative mass object this Shapiro “delay” is actually an
advance. Thus an object with negative mass could be used for superluminal
communication, as a type of warp drive. Hence it is forbidden by the previous
result.
The classical theorem [14] has an important limitation which should be no-
ticed: it requires the spacetime to be asymptotically flat at null infinity, not just
spacelike infinity. In other words, the spacetime must remain sufficiently stable
that its mass can be probed by a lightray going from past null infinity to future
null infinity. For example, there exist Kaluza-Klein spacetimes with negative
ADM mass in which a “bubble of nothing” contracts and then expands, asymp-
totically approaching the speed of light [53]. This is not a contradiction because
the bubble of nothing hits null infinity and prevents it from being asymptot-
ically flat. Similar problems arise for bubbles of AdS space inside of a “false
vacuum” with zero cosmological constant.
For asymptotically Schwarzschild solutions in 4 dimensions, one can also de-
rive a partial converse result: any solution with positive mass is not a warp drive
spacetime. Because the gravitational potential falls off with distance like 1/r,
the integrated time delay is logarithmically divergent, and therefore the Shapiro
delay from the asymptotic gravitational field is +∞. This overcomes any finite
Shapiro advance coming from the interior of the spacetime. Unfortunately, this
makes the no-warp-drive result somewhat trivial in this case, since it does not
rule out any asymptotically Schwarzschild solutions with positive mass.
However the result is not as trivial for D ≥ 5 spacetimes, where the Shapiro
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delay for Schwarzschild is finite. Nor is it trivial for asymptotically Anti-de
Sitter spacetimes, which we consider next.
Causality in Anti-de Sitter. The results above can be directly general-
ized to the case in which the spacetime is asymptotically AdS, by choosing
L+ and L− to lie on the AdS boundary. The proof of the result is analogous,
notwithstanding the fact that anti-de Sitter space technically violates global hy-
perbolicity. (The only reason why Theorem 2 needed global hyperbolicity was to
ensure that the spacetime region had good causality properties. But AdS space
has equally good causality properties after one imposes boundary conditions at
spatial infinity.) This generalizes the classical theorems of Ref. [12, 13].
This also fits in nicely with what is known about the AdS/CFT conjecture.
In order for a theory of gravity to have a field theory dual living on its boundary,
it is essential that between two spatial locations A and B on the boundary, it
is impossible to get from A to B any faster when travelling through the bulk,
than when going around on the boundary. Otherwise, it would be possible to
send signals faster than light in the CFT [54]. The GSL is a plausible physical
principle enforcing this requirement.
4.4 Time Machines
The final application of the fine-grained GSL will be to rule out time machines,
which is again a generalization of classical results [9]. Up until now, we have
assumed that spacetime is globally hyperbolic. But global hyperbolicity rules
out closed timelike curves (CTC’s) by definition, making any proof trivial. So
in this section, we will assume instead that a) all CTC’s in the spacetime are to
the future of some point p, which is in turn to the future of I−, b) for any two
points p and q, J+(p) ∩ J+(q) is compact (i.e. the other component of global
hyperbolicity [43]), and c) spacetime is asymptotically flat.
The goal will be to show that a CTC can never form. Since a CTC is an
infinite worldline wrapped around the same points periodically, ∂I−(CTC) is a
future horizon.18 Excluding the future of p, spacetime is globally hyperbolic,
so there is no problem defining complete slices for the generalized entropy. By
applying condition (b) to the point p and any point on the CTC, ∂I−(CTC)
must have compact slices on the globally hyperbolic part of the manifold. Thus
the generalized entropy should increase towards the future on ∂I−(CTC) on a
compact slice.
But by asymptotic flatness, this compact horizon must be contracting at
early times, violating the GSL for the same reason that baby universes did in
section 4.1. Consequently, assuming the GSL and condition b (which is the
other half of global hyperbolicity), it is impossible for any experimenter sitting
at a point p in an asymptotically flat universe to arrange for a CTC to form.
18If you think that a circular worldline should not count as “infinite” in the relevant sense,
simply consider a slightly wiggly line near the CTC which never exactly intersects itself.
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Similarly, the time-reverse of the above argument using GSL shows that if there
are currently existing time machines it is impossible for them to be destroyed.
5 Does it still work for Quantum Gravity?
The above results have been proven on the assumption that spacetime can be
approximated by a smooth, globally-hyperbolic, Lorentzian manifold subject to
a small quantum perturbation, such that the resulting spacetime satisfies the
GSL exactly. The question is whether we expect the result to hold even if some
of these assumptions are relaxed. In particular, the following questions arise:
What about thermodynamic fluctuations which cause the entropy to tem-
porarily decrease, thus making the GSL not exact? Do quantum fluctuations
in the metric make the GSL ill-defined in the quantum gravity regime? And
what about global hyperbolicity and the other assumptions involved in the no-go
results of section 4?
5.1 Entropy Fluctuations
All thermodynamic systems have fluctuations, since it is always possible that
the degrees of freedom in a complex system will, by chance, temporarily enter an
unlikely configuration. When the entropy is defined as the Boltzmann entropy
S = ln N , where N is the number of microstates in a macrostate, this can lead
to a temporary decrease in the entropy. However, in the approach to the second
law which is used here, the entropy of quantum fields is defined in Eq. (2) using
the Gibbs entropy S = −tr(ρ ln ρ). As shown in section 2.1, this entropy can be
proven to be exactly nondecreasing. In the case of the GSL one also has the area
term. I have argued elsewhere [28] that one can take a similar interpretation of
the generalized entropy if one defines the GSL using the expectation value 〈A〉,
as suggested in Ref. [55]. The GSL as defined in this way need not have any
downward fluctuations, which is convenient for proofs of the GSL.
Nevertheless, changing the definition of the entropy cannot change the un-
derlying physics, and the entropy fluctuations are still present and physically
important. In the Gibbs interpretation, these entropy fluctuations appear when
one invokes the probability interpretation of the density matrix ρ. For example,
consider the spin of an electron which has two states,up and down. If the system
is in uniformly mixed density matrix with diagonal (1/2, 1/2), the entropy is
ln 2. But this density matrix only represents our ignorance; the electron may
well actually be in the up state. And it is easy to show that the maximum
entropy associated with any pure state is 0. The following superficially valid
syllogism is therefore fallacious:
1. If the electron is in the up state, S = 0.
2. The entropy of the electron is S = ln 2,
3. Therefore the electron is not in the up state.
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The correct conclusion is that the electron might not be in the up state, a very
different statement.
Similarly, if the generalized entropy decreases somewhere on a null surfaceN ,
the proper conclusion to draw is not that N is not a horizon, but that N might
not be a horizon. Let us take as a specific example the no-traversable-wormholes
result from section 4.1. A sufficiently adventurous spacefarer might not be
deterred from attempted to crossing a wormhole simply because it is uncertain
whether or not he will make it. Suppose then that our intrepid hero lives in an
asymptotically flat universe with state Ψ, and then jumps into the wormhole
even though he only has a probability 1 > p > 0 of successfully reaching the
other side. Assuming he does reach the other side, it is then appropriate, at
least on a forward-going basis, to project the state of the universe onto a new
state Ψ′ in which the wormhole jump certainly occurs, by using the projection
operator P onto the fact of the wormhole traversal:
|Ψ′〉 = P√
p
|Ψ〉 = √p|Ψ〉+
√
1− p|χ〉, (35)
where χ is some orthogonal state.
Here it is necessary to be careful. As usual in quantum mechanical measure-
ment, the state Ψ′ will not be a good description of the state of the universe
prior to the time of measurement. In fact, since the additional branch χ of the
superposition is defined using a future boundary condition, by the arguments in
section 2.1, one expects the coarse-grained ordinary entropy of χ to be decreas-
ing with time prior to the act of measurement. However, it is not necessary to
insist on Ψ′ being the true state of the universe, or on wavefunction collapse be-
ing the correct interpretation of quantum mechanical measurements. It is only
required that Ψ′ be a well-defined state in the theory, to which the fine-grained
GSL must therefore apply. One expects that Ψ′ will be asymptotically flat since
this boundary condition should not be affected by anything which goes on in
the interior of spacetime. Then Ψ′ is an asymptotically flat spacetime in which
there exists a traversable wormhole with probability 1, contradicting the re-
sult in section 4.1. Similar arguments apply to the other trapped-surface no-go
results in section 4.19
19In contrast, entropy fluctuations are relevant when applying the GSL to inflationary cos-
mology. In an inflationary scenario, there is a scalar field Φ with some potential V (Φ), which
gives rise to vacuum energy and a de-Sitter-like exponential expansion. As this scalar field
rolls down the potential, inflation comes to a halt. The argument of eternal inflation is that
quantum fluctuations sometimes push the field back up the potential and thus increase rather
than decrease the vacuum energy [56]. Since an upward fluctuation results in a decrease in
the horizon area, na¨ıvely it would seem that the GSL forbids this process as well. If so, the
vacuum energy would be nonincreasing as time passes. And if it cannot increase, one would
generically expect it to decrease, and eventually exit inflation everywhere.
Assessing the validity of this argument requires a careful consideration of vacuum fluctua-
tions. The argument above that entropy fluctuations do not matter applies to asymptotically
flat spacetimes. De sitter space is different for two reasons: a) In de Sitter space there is
a maximum value of the generalized entropy, so the necessary downward fluctuation ∆S of
the horizon entropy is finite rather than infinite. b) In order to have eternal inflation, it is
not necessary that any pre-selected region of spacetime remain inflating, but only that there
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It therefore follows from the GSL that the probability of forming a baby
universe, a traversable wormhole, or restarting inflation in asymptotically flat
or AdS spacetime, is exactly zero. This is a little surprising because one might
have thought that these things could occur through quantum tunneling [48, 46].
However, it is in accordance with the observation in Ref. [47] that one cannot
restart inflation in AdS spacetimes in the context of AdS/CFT.
5.2 Quantum Geometries
Since singularities are regions where quantum gravity effects might become im-
portant, one critical question is whether the GSL (as defined in section 2.2)
continues to remain well-defined and true in the quantum gravity regime. If
not, then the quantum singularity theorem might break down just when it is
needed, although many of the other applications of the Penrose theorem would
continue to be useful. Consider the following hierarchy of increasingly “quan-
tum” treatments of spacetime:
1. Weak semiclassical perturbations. This regime is simply quantum field
theory in curved spacetime, plus infinitesimal corrections due to the grav-
itational deformation from matter. (This regime justifies the ‘semiclassical
expansion’ used in Theorems 1,3 &4 of section 3.)
2. Strong semiclassical effects. In this regime one permits the quantum fields
to have large gravitational effects, but neglects any quantum fluctuations
in the metric, so that spacetime is still described by a smooth Lorentzian
manifold. This regime can be justified in some cases when there are a
large number N of matter fields and one takes h¯ → 0 while holding Nh¯
fixed. This suppresses graviton loops relative to matter loops.
3. Quantum Lorentzian manifold. In this regime one takes into account
the fluctuations in the metric, treating the metric as a quantum field
living on a fixed, continuous topological space. Some of the geometrical
quantities now fail to commute. This regime includes spacetimes which
can be described by perturbative quantum gravity. It is even possible, if
the asymptotic safety scenario is true, that this regime might encompass
a complete theory of quantum gravity [57].
4. Something New. Examples include causal sets [58], the discrete spacetimes
of loop quantum gravity [59] or matrix theory [60], etc. Here one cannot
say anything nonspeculative except on the assumption of a specific model.
Which of these regimes is physically relevant for the no-go results?
exists some region that continues to do so. If, over a given time interval, a Hubble volume
increases in volume by a factor of N , it is only necessary to have a probability of about 1/N
that inflation continue in each Hubble volume in order to keep inflation going somewhere. If
lnN > ∆S, then one would expect the necessary entropy fluctuation to occur in one of the N
regions. It would be interesting to check whether this condition places significant constraints
on eternal inflation scenarios.
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Not all of the results in this article require probing the quantum gravity
regime. For example, the absence of traversable wormholes (section 4.1) or
warp drives (section 4.3) is interesting even perturbatively, in the weak semi-
classical regime (#1). That is because there exist classical solutions that are
right on the edge of violating these results, so that a violation could be seen
even perturbatively. (For warp drives, consider pertrubations to the vacuum
solution. For traversable wormholes, perturb the eternal black hole.)20
But the usefulness of the no-go results concerning singularity theorems and
baby universes (sections 4.1-4.2) depends on their applicability to the region near
the singularity. Consider a spacetime whose classical evolution has a singularity,
and suppose that some resolution of the singularity were possible. Necessarily,
any resolution of the singularity would have to involve nonperturbative effects,
and therefore the weak semiclassical regime (#1) will be insufficient to resolve
the singularity.21
However, there is still hope for a useful result. The key thing to notice is
that these results involve two distinct locations on the same null-surface N ,
separated by some null interval ∆λ. The region X near the quantum trapped
surface may be weakly coupled, even while the classically singular region Y
is strongly coupled. Near X , it can be shown that the generalized entropy is
decreasing somewhere on the null surface. Then the GSL implies that N cannot
be a causal horizon. Near Y , we use the fact that N is not a horizon to show
that there can be no infinite worldline W in Y .
For example, in the case of the Big Bang result, the region Y is the region
near22 the classical would-be initial singularity when the universe was very hot
and dense, while X may be taken to be the present-day cosmology, which is
very well-described by classical general relativity. The analysis of region X
by itself can therefore be carried out entirely in the weak semiclassical regime
(#1). Thus, the applications of Theorems 1 and 2 to region X are insensitive to
quantum gravity effects. X is also the only location at which we used a formula
for the generalized entropy Sgen, so quantum gravity corrections to the formula
for Sgen are irrelevant to the validity of the result.
This leaves the analysis of the strongly coupled region Y , which might be in
any of regimes #2− 4. In order for the GSL to be well defined, it is necessary
that the concept of a causal horizon still exist. The notion is clearly defined in
the strong semiclassical regime (#2) due to the existence of a Lorentzian space-
time. For a quantum Lorentzian manifold (#3), the causal structure becomes
fuzzy and thus one might worry about whether the causal horizon is defined.
Let us assume the following correspondence principles: A) that the requirement
20Of course, if these results continue to hold even in even more quantum spacetimes (regimes
#2-4), for the reasons suggested below, so much the better.
21As a general mathematical fact, when singularities in some function are resolved, the reso-
lution tends to be nonperturbative. At any finite order in perturbation theory the singularity
typically gets more divergent rather than less divergent. A simple example: if you Taylor
expand the function f(x) = 1/(x2 + a2) in a around a = 0, each term in the Taylor series is
progressively more divergent with respect to x, but at finite positive values of a, there is no
singularity. I would like to thank Ed Witten for pointing out this issue.
22and before, if the singularity is resolved
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in general relativity that coordinates be smooth is merely for technical conve-
nience, and that therefore one can consistently formulate general relativity to
be covariant under the choice of arbitrary continuous coordinates, not just dif-
feomorphisms, B) that for any way of consistently gauge-fixing classical general
relativity, there is a corresponding way to gauge-fix a quantum Lorentzian man-
ifold, without introducing an anomaly into the true diffeomorphism-invariance
of the theory.
Let there be some locus of points L defined by some generally covariant
prescription. Then ∂I−(L) is a continuous (but not necessarily smooth) surface
of codimension 1. By assumption A above it is consistent to gauge-fix general
relativity using a coordinate system in which one coordinate x satisfies x = 0
at ∂I−(L). In this coordinate system the horizon location is in a well-defined,
fixed position in space, and therefore does not fluctuate in its position. If L
is taken to be a future-infinite worldline defined by any coordinate invariant
prescription, this shows that the notion of a future horizon is well-defined. The
GSL can then be defined to require that any such future causal horizon have
nondecreasing entropy, at least in the semiclassical region X where we know
how to define Sgen.
Even if the spacetime geometry is described by some new discrete structure
(#4), it still seems reasonable to believe that the notion of a future horizon may
be well-defined, if this discrete structure has a fundamental notion of causality
built into it. One can think of the location of a causal horizon as being defined
by the way in which it divides spacetime points into exterior and interior regions.
The exterior of a future horizon can be defined as J−(Wfut), the causal past of
a future-infinite worldline. A worldline W can be defined as a chain of points
in causal sequence. The only part of the definition which depends on anything
other than a causal structure, is the requirement that Wfut be infinite. But this
can naturally be defined in a discrete geometry by requiring W to consist of an
infinite number of points.
So if the quantum geometry of the universe is a discrete causal set or anything
richer, the notion of a future horizon should be well-defined, and it should be
possible to ask whether the GSL is true. Of course, it might turn out to be
false. For example, if quantum gravity violates Lorentz invariance, then the
arguments of Ref. [61] suggest that the GSL will be invalid.
However, it seems more elegant for the GSL to be true in quantum gravity.
This would explain the success of horizon thermodynamics in semiclassical gen-
eral relativity. Not only that, but by the results in sections 4.3 and 4.4, it would
also ensure that the theory has positive energies and good causality.
Global Hyperbolicity. About half of the results in section 4 assume global
hyperbolicity, either directly or through the use of Theorems 2 or 4. This in-
cludes the generalization of the Penrose singularity theorem (sections 4.1 and
4.2), some of the discussion about the thermodynamic beginning of the universe
(4.2), and the prohibition of warp drives, and negative mass objects (4.3). On
the other hand, the prohibitions on viable baby universes, traversable worm-
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holes, and restarting inflation (4.1) use only the GSL, while the no-time ma-
chines result (4.4) uses a weakened form of global hyperbolicity.
If the theory of quantum gravity is fully predictive, one expects some ana-
logue of global hyperbolicity to be true, but it may not have quite the same
implications as in general relativity. Just because topology change is forbidden
for continuous globally hyperbolic manifolds [45], does not necessarily mean it
could not occur in discrete spacetimes. Thus it is necessary to examine whether
one expects theorems 2 and 4 to continue to hold. Theorem 2 only depends on
global hyperbolicity insofar as this is necessary to identify causal subsystems; it
is therefore likely to hold in any theory with causality.
Theorem 4 depends on global hyperbolicity in a more subtle way. The basic
causality assumption underlying Theorem 4 is that an outward moving causal
surface on a noncompact spatial slice cannot come to an end without encoun-
tering a boundary of the spacetime. This might happen in two different ways:
(a) A noncompact space could become compact as a result of time evolution, or
(b) A noncompact space could split into two regions, one of them compact, and
the other noncompact. It seems unlikely that quantum topology change could
permit (a), since it would require an “infinitely large” tunneling event. Scenario
(b) is the disconnected baby universe scenario, which is forbidden by the GSL
without using global hyperbolicity.23 Accepting these arguments against (a)
and (b), it is not unlikely that an analogue of Theorem 4 may well apply in full
quantum gravity.
Thus there is a reasonable possibility that the Penrose singularity theorem
can be proven even in the context of full quantum gravity. This would go
against the conventional wisdom that the singularities are an symptom of the
incompleteness of the classical theory, and are resolved quantum mechanically.
However, it should be pointed out that just because there are singularities in the
sense that spacetime comes to an end in some places, does not mean that there
are any physical quantities which become infinite at the singularity. A discrete
geometry might still resolve the singularity in the latter sense by cutting off the
spacetime at distances shorter than the Planck scale.
6 Conclusion
It has been shown above that, under the assumption that spacetime is a globally
hyperbolic Lorentzian manifold, the fine-grained GSL requires black holes and
infinite FRW universes to have singularities, and places severe constraints on
baby universes and any cosmology prior to the Big Bang. It additionally pre-
vents asymptotically flat spacetimes from having negative ADM masses, warp
drives or traversable wormholes, or developing time machines or inflating re-
gions. In all of these cases, theorems of classical general relativity have been
23Additionally, (b) raises potential problems with causality. If one runs the process in
time-reverse, one finds that two completely unrelated regions of spacetime spontaneously join
together. This seems to be an extreme violation of locality. But see Ref. [62] for a possible
way around this argument.
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extended to semiclassical settings by using the GSL as a premise instead of
the null energy condition. The notion of a “trapped surface” still persists in
this quantum setting, and ensures that these qualitative features of semiclassi-
cal gravity are the same as those of classical general relativity. (It should be
reiterated, however, that the GSL has only been proven in limited regimes [28],
and that there might be other reasonable ways to formulate the GSL besides
the one given in section 2.2.)
There are also some—necessarily speculative—indications that these results
might hold in a full theory of quantum gravity. Although the semiclassical ap-
proximation was used to derive some of the no-go results, it was only used in
nearly classical regions, either a large distance or a long time away from high
curvature quantum gravity regions. Other than the GSL itself, the only assump-
tions made about the high curvature region were that spacetime continues to
have some of the same primitive properties as a Lorentzian spacetime: a notion
of causality used to define horizons, a notion of predictivity analogous to global
hyperbolicity, distinctions between finite and infinite lengths, and compact and
noncompact regions. Given the successes of horizon thermodynamics, it is nat-
ural to suppose that the GSL holds even at the level of quantum gravity, and
thus that not all singularities are resolved in quantum gravity.
The statistical mechanical argument for a beginning in time, based on the
fact that entropy decreases when going to the past, was also generalized to an
argument from the coarse-grained GSL. Together with the singularity theorem,
this leads to a prima facie argument that time had a true beginning at the Big
Bang some 13.7 billion years ago. In section 4.2, in order to make a plausible
GSL-satisfying cosmology with an infinite past, it was necessary to postulate
both that the cosmos is spatially finite, and that the arrow of time was reversed
before some time t0. This kind of bounce evades both the singularity and
thermodynamic arrow constraints, but still has in some sense a thermodynamic
‘beginning’ in time at the moment of lowest entropy. That is, both the past
and the future would be explained in terms of the low entropy state at t0, while
the state at t0 would itself have no explanation in terms of anything to the
future or the past. (Thus the moment t0 would seem to raise the same sorts of
philosophical questions that any other sort of beginning in time would.)
The fact that the no-go results forbid various processes with probability 0 is
interesting because it goes against the usual experience in quantum field theory
that anything not forbidden by kinematics or conservation laws must occur
with some nonzero probability. This suggests that there may be a formulation of
quantum geometry based on horizon thermodynamics in which these constraints
seem more natural.
The notion of a quantum trapped surface from Theorem 4 may be a clue
here. If we think that horizon thermodynamics works because of the statistical
mechanics of the quantum gravity degrees of freedom near or on the horizon,
what should we make of the fact that on certain surfaces, the entropy does
decrease? It is as though each null surface must either choose to be a causal
horizon and behave in certain respects like a closed system, or else violate the
second law and be punished for it by coming to an end in a finite time. Can this
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basic dichotomy be explained somehow from the perspective of the microscopic
horizon degrees of freedom?
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Appendix
This appendix will prove a theorem used in section 2.1 to prove that entropy in-
creases in the context of ordinary thermodynamics. There, the approach was to
model our uncertainty about time evolution using a mixture of possible unitary
operators, acting on any separable Hilbert Space.
Let dU be a probability distribution over the space of possible unitary op-
erators, such that the total probability is 1:
∫
U
dU = 1. (36)
Then the operation to be performed on the state ρ is
ρ→ T (ρ) ≡
∫
U
UρU † dU. (37)
T is a linear map from the space of all density matrices to itself. There are some
consequences of the fact that the map is just a sum over unitary operators: a) By
conservation of probability, T must preserve the trace of ρ. b) Since probabilities
cannot be negative, T must map states with nonnegative eigenvalues to other
states with nonnegative eigenvalues. Furthermore, c) Since every U preserves
the identity state I, T (I) = I.
Such maps cannot decrease the entropy, a fact which has been derived from
the Uhlmann theory of mixing [20], by way of an even stronger statement about
probability eigenvalues: namely that there is no way of transferring probability
from a smaller eigenvalue to a larger one.
More precisely, for all natural numbers i, the sum of the ith largest eigenval-
ues of the final density matrix must be no greater than the ith largest eigenvalues
of the initial density matrix. In other words, if we consider the spectrum of prob-
ability eigenvalues of ρ, a probability eigenvalue can only increase in value if it
does so at the expense of eigenvalues with greater probability. This stronger
statement is more powerful than simply asserting that entropy increases, be-
cause it yields a separate statement for each number i.
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One might worry about how to interpret “the sum of the ith largest eigen-
vectors” if ρ is degenerate. There is then an ambiguity as to a) which basis to
use to count eigenvectors, and b) how to order the eigenvalues seeing as some of
them are equal. However, because by definition all of the degenerate eigenvalues
have the same value, it makes no difference to the sum how we partition the
degenerate states so long as we make some choice.
A proof of this result follows:
Definitions:
ρ is the density matrix,
T () is the trace and identity preserving, positive linear map,
I is the identity matrix,
M = ρ− piI, where pi is the ith largest eigenvalue,
P projects onto the ith largest eigenvalues of ρ, and
Q projects onto the ith largest eigenvalues of T (ρ).
Theorem 5: The theorem to be proven can now be stated as follows:
tr(Q T (ρ)Q) ≤ tr(PρP ) (38)
Proof: Since P commutes with ρ and thus M , we may write
M = PMP + (1 − P )M(1− P ) = A−B (39)
where A and B are manifestly positive. Now by positivity,
tr(Q T (A)Q) ≤ tr(T (A)) = tr(A) (40)
since a partial trace of a positive matrix cannot give more than the full trace,
while
tr(Q T (B)Q) ≥ 0 (41)
because each operation preserves positivity. Therefore by linearity,
tr(Q T (M)Q) ≤ tr(A) = tr(PMP ) (42)
which shows that the sum of the i larger eigenvalues can only decrease. But M
and ρ only differ by I = T (I) so the result holds for ρ as well. Q.E.D.
Corollary 5.1: Any quantity expressible as tr(f(ρ)), where f is any convex
function, is nondecreasing. This is implied by the fact that the probability
eigenvalues can only evolve towards equalization [20].
This stronger statement about probability eigenvalues is equivalent to saying
that any convex function of the probability eigenvalues is nondecreasing. Pick
the convex function:
f(p) = 0 p ≤ pi (43)
= pi − p p ≥ pi (44)
This function must satisfy
trf(T (ρ)) ≥ trf(ρ) (45)
which implies that the probability eigenvalues can only equalize.
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